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1
Knowing how without knowing that
Ian Harmon
1.0 Introduction

Intellectualism is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to
lmowing that something is the case. Anti-intellectualism is the view that knowing how
consists in certain sorts of abilities or dispositions. In this paper I offer arguments against
two versions of intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson (2001) hold that propositional
knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for know-how. Against their view, I argue
that there are cases in which such knowledge is insufficient. Bengson and Moffett (2012)
argue that propositional knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient for know-how. Rather,
they hold that knowing how requires meeting a further condition, namely, standing in a
non-propositional knowledge-of relation to a way of doing something. Against this view,
I argue that if propositional knowledge is necessary for know-how, then we must deny
that many clear instances of know-how are in fact such instances. Taken together, my
cases against Stanley and Williamson and Bengson and Moffett show that propositional
knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for know-how.

According
to Stanley and
Williamson (hereafter, S&W):
and Williamson
on know-how
2.0 Stanley
S knows how to X if and only if
(a) for some way, w, S knows that w is a way for S to X and
(b) S entertains the proposition that w is a wayfor S to X under a practical mode
of presentation.





